Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Produktbeschreibung

This book systematically explains why some countries are democracies while others are not. 

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Part I. Questions and Answers; Section 1. Paths of Political Development: 1.
Britain; 2. Argentina; 3. Singapore; 4. South Africa, 5. The agenda; Section 2.
Our Argument: 1. Democracy vs. nondemocracy; 2. Building blocks of our approach;
3. Towards our basic story; 4. Our theory of democratization; 5. Democratic
consolidation; 6. Determinants of democracy; 7. Political identities and the
nature of conflict; 8. Democracy in a picture; 9. Overview of the book; Section
3. What Do We Know About Democracy?: 1. Measuring democracy; 2. Patterns of
democracy; 3. Democracy, inequality and redistribution; 4. Crises and democracy;
5. Social unrest and democratization; 6. The literature; 7. Our contribution;
Part II. Modelling Politics; Section 4. Democratic Politics: 1. Introduction; 2.
Aggregating individual preferences; 3. Single-peaked preferences and the median
voter theorem; 4. Our workhorse models; 5. Democracy and political equality; 6.
Conclusion; Section 5. Nondemocratic Politics: 1. Introduction; 2. Power and
constraints in nondemocratic politics; 3. Modeling preferences and constraints
in nondemocracies; 4. Commitment problems; 5. A simple game of promises; 6. A
dynamic model; 7. Incentive compatible promises; 8. Conclusion; Part III. The
Creation and Consolidation of Democracy; Section 6. Democratization: 1.
Introduction; 2. The role of political institutions; 3. Preferences over
political institutions; 4. Political power and institutions; 5. A 'static' model
of democratization; 6. Democratization or repression?; 7. A dynamic model of
democratization; 8. Subgame perfect equilibria; 9. Alternative political
identities; 10. Targeted transfers; 11. Power of the elite in democracy; 12.
Ideological preferences over regimes; 13. Democratization in pictures; 14.
Equilibrium revolutions; 15. Conclusion; Section 7. Coups and Consolidation: 1.
Introduction; 2. Incentives for coups; 3. A static model of coups; 4. A dynamic
model of the creation and consolidation of democracy; 5. Alternative political
identities; 6. Targeted transfers; 7. Power in democracy and coups; 8.
Consolidation in a picture; 9. Defensive coups; 10. Conclusion; Part IV. Putting
the Models to Work; Section 8. The Role of the Middle Class: 1. Introduction; 2.
The three-class model; 3. Emergence of partial democracy; 4. From partial to
full democracy; 5. Repression: the middle class as a buffer; 6. Repression:
soft-liners vs. hard-liners; 7. The role of the middle class in consolidating
democracy; 8. Conclusion; Section 9. Economic Structure and Democracy: 1.
Introduction; 2. Economic structure and income distribution; 3. Political
conflict; 4. Capital, land and the transition to democracy; 5. Financial
integration; 6. Increased political integration; 7. Alternative assumptions
about the nature of international trade. 8. Conclusion; Part V. Conclusion and
The Future of Democracy; Section 10. Conclusion and the Future of Democracy: 1.
Paths of political development revisited; 2. Extension and areas for future
research; 3. The future of democracy; Part VI. Appendix; Section 11. Appendix to
Section 4: The Distribution of Power in Democracy: 1. Introduction; 2.
Probabilistic voting models; 3. Lobbying; 4. Partisan politics and political
capture. 

Autoreninfo

Acemoglu, Daron
Daron Acemoglu is Charles P. Kindleberger Professor of Applied Economics at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a member of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research's Program on Institutions, Organizations, and Growth. He received the 2005 John Bates Clark Medal awarded by the American Economic Association to the best economist working in the United States under age 40. He is the author of the textbook Introduction to Modern Economic Growth and coeditor of Econometrica and NBER Macroannual.Robinson, James A.
James A. Robinson is Professor of Government at Harvard University. He is a Faculty Associate at the Institute for Quantitative Social Science and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and is a member of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research's Program on Institutions, Organizations, and Growth. He is coeditor with Jared Diamond of Natural Experiments in History (2009).